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Abstract 
 
Blockchain technology has the potential to resolve 
trust concerns in cross-organizational workflows and 
to reduce reliance on paper-based documents as trust 
anchors. Although these prospects are real, so is 
regulatory uncertainty. In particular, the 
reconciliation of blockchain with Europe’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is proving to be 
a significant challenge. We tackled this challenge with 
the German Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees. Here, we explain how we used Action 
Research to guide the Federal Office in creating a 
GDPR-compliant blockchain solution for the German 
asylum procedure. Moreover, we explain the 
architecture of the Federal Office’s solution and 
present two design principles for developing GDPR-
compliant blockchain solutions for cross-
organizational workflow management. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Within organizational boundaries, centralized 
workflow management systems have proven highly 
effective at increasing efficiency and reducing costs 
[23, 37]. However, beyond these boundaries, 
workflow management becomes challenging as 
mutual distrust often prevents the delegation of 
workflow governance to a central authority [23]. 
It has been proposed that the use of blockchain 
technology could ease these trust concerns [27]. 
Blockchains are distributed databases that use peer-to-
peer protocols and cryptographic hash functions to 
propagate and store data in a tamper-resistant and 
consistent manner among the participants of a 
blockchain network [5, 16]. These properties allow the 
participants of a blockchain network to establish a 
“shared truth” without the need for a central authority 
[5]. 
Specifically, blockchain could increase the 
transparency of cross-organizational workflows and 
reduce the use of paper-based documents as trust 
anchors [27]. Although these prospects are real, 
regulatory uncertainties continue to hinder the 
adoption of blockchain-based workflow management 
[18]. These uncertainties include those arising from 
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). The GDPR codifies several rights of data 
subjects, such as the right to rectification and the right 
to erasure of their data. Moreover, it demands 
transparent responsibility for compliance with the 
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GDPR and bars processing of personal data without a 
lawful basis. 
These requirements conflict with several of 
blockchain’s properties. In particular, the right to 
erasure and rectification, and the GDPR’s requirement 
that data controllers can be identified and held to 
account, present challenges for blockchain-based 
solutions [20]. 
In this paper, we argue that these conflicts can be 
resolved through a combination of organizational 
means and a three-layered architecture that enables 
rectification and erasure. Our arguments draw on 
learnings from our involvement in an ongoing 
blockchain project with Germany’s Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which seeks to 
introduce a blockchain-based solution for the 
management of Germany’s asylum procedure [13].  
In particular, we outline what we learned in the 
course of three Action Research (AR) cycles that we 
used to guide the BAMF towards a GDPR-compliant 
blockchain solution. We also discuss how the 
architecture facilitates rectification and erasure of 
personal data, and present two actionable design 
principles for designing GDPR-compliant solutions in 
general and for cross-organization workflow 
management in particular.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we 
provide theoretical background on blockchain 
technology, the GDPR, and alternatives to reconcile 
the two. In Section 3, we describe our use of AR and 
the BAMF’s blockchain project. Section 4 details the 
three cycles of our AR approach and discusses the 
architecture. In Section 5, we present and discuss the 
design principles we drew from the BAMF case. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
Blockchain technology offers an innovative 
approach to data management. Instead of relying on a 
single trustworthy keeper, blockchain networks 
manage data by network consensus. 
In many instances, this data is personal, i.e. it can be 
used to identify a natural person. In the European 
Union, processing of personal data has to comply with 
the binding rules of the GDPR. Several of these rules 
are challenging to meet, such as the need for clear 
responsibilities in the blockchain network, the 
establishment of lawful bases for processing, and the 
observance of the right to rectification and erasure. 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Blockchain 
 
In 2008, Nakamoto [26] conceived blockchain as a 
distributed digital ledger for Bitcoin transactions [3, 
5]. Since these modest conceptual beginnings, 
researchers and practitioners have added various 
features, and developed blockchain-based solutions 
for cross-organizational workflow management [14], 
supply chain records [17, 25], security and privacy in 
the context of the Internet of Things [10, 32], finance 
and assurance [21], social business [33], and 
governmental services, as for example in Estonia [24] 
and Dubai [1]. 
Condos et al. [8] describe a blockchain as an 
electronic registry for digital records, events, and 
transactions, which is managed by the participants of 
a distributed computer network. In conceptual terms, a 
blockchain is a decentralized database that validates 
and stores data in so-called blocks. Consensus 
mechanisms order new blocks in an ever-expanding 
chain in order to ensure integrity and tamper-
resistance [7, 29]. This chain is stored redundantly 
with each participant (technically called ‘nodes’) in 
the blockchain network, and new blocks are 
propagated throughout the network via peer-to-peer 
protocols [16].  
From a more technical perspective, each block 
contains validated and structured data, and integrity is 
afforded by cryptographic hash functions. Appending 
a new block requires the calculation of the hash value 
of the data in the new block (𝑛) and the hash value of 
the previous block (𝑛 − 1). As such, the hash value of 
block 𝑛 includes the recursive hashes of all previous 
blocks [33]. Consensus mechanisms allow the 
blockchain network to agree on the validity and the 
order of the data in a block, and the correct order of 
the blocks [33]. Depending on the specific blockchain, 
technology (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger), 
blockchain developers can choose from a variety of 
consensus mechanisms, each of which provides a 
different level of security and latency, and requires 
more or less energy [7, 36].  
Blockchain solutions may also differ in terms of 
their assignment of read and write permissions 
(permissioned vs. permissionless blockchains), 
privacy (public vs. private blockchains), 
centralization, and efficiency [7, 28, 36]. The Bitcoin-
Blockchain is a typical example of a public, 
permissionless blockchain. Each participant can 
download the blockchain, read all transactions, submit 
new transactions, and mine new blocks. In contrast, a 
private blockchain allows only verified members to 
see the stored data. Most private blockchains are also 
permissioned. This means that the network can decide 
who will become a new member and who can submit, 
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write, and read the information on the blockchain. 
Because this control requires that the identities of all 
network participants are known, a permissioned 
blockchain is less anonymous. Hyperledger is a typical 
example of a private, permissioned blockchain.  
 
2.2. The General Data Protection Regulation 
 
The GDPR standardizes the rules for the 
processing of personal data by both private and public 
data processors throughout the member states of the 
European Union (EU). It aims to allow data subjects 
to hold controllers and processors of their data to 
account, and it enshrines privacy by design and by 
default. At the same time, it aims to foster the free 
movement of personal data across the EU member 
states. 
The GDPR applies to any act of processing any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person in the EU, and to any such act by a data 
processor operating in the EU. It builds on a range of 
principles, as outlined in Article 5. Most importantly, 
it outlaws any processing of personal data unless the 
processor has a lawful basis, such as documented 
consent by the data subject or if the processing is 
required to meet contractual and legal obligations. 
In particular, the GDPR strengthens the rights of 
data subjects (Chapter 3, Articles 12-23 GDPR). These 
rights include, among others, the right to rectification 
(Article 16) and the right to erasure (Article 17) [15].  
 
2.3. Reconciliation of blockchain with the 
GDPR 
 
Reconciling the processing of personal data 
through a blockchain network and the demands of the 
GDPR poses three essential challenges.  
Firstly, the GDPR demands that responsibilities for 
ensuring compliance are clearly identified and 
designated, particularly when several parties jointly 
control the processing of personal data. Establishing 
these responsibilities is often not easy, especially if the 
blockchain network is public and permissionless. 
Secondly, the GDPR prohibits the processing of data 
unless, among others, this has been explicitly 
authorized by the subject or is required to fulfill 
obligations under law or contract (lawfulness of 
processing). However, establishing a lawful basis for 
each act of data processing in a blockchain network 
can be particularly cumbersome. The third challenge 
is the reconciliation of the rights to rectification and 
erasure with blockchain’s premise of tamper-resistant 
on-chain storage. From a legal perspective, these 
challenges could be addressed using three different 
approaches [12]:  
First, in the "central authority" approach, the 
network nominates a central authority. This authority 
may consist of a single participant of the blockchain 
network or a group of participants. The central 
authority assumes responsibility for compliance with 
the GDPR, establishes rights of network participants, 
and creates legal agreements for data processing with 
the nodes. The authority also secures the lawful bases 
for data processing and handles any related matters. If 
the blockchain network only processes the personal 
data of network participants, the central authority 
would have to create contracts with each network 
participant. If the network processes the personal data 
of third parties, the central authority must also secure 
the lawful basis for the processing of said third party 
data.  
The right to rectification can be observed by 
submitting a rectification transaction to the 
blockchain. The right to erasure of personal data is 
waived by way of contract between the central 
authority and the network’s participants, and affected 
third parties if necessary. In case any of these contracts 
become void, the blockchain may have to be modified. 
Second, in the “shared responsibility” approach, all 
participants in the blockchain network jointly assume 
responsibility for GDPR compliance. The lawful basis 
for the processing of personal data relating to network 
participants and/or third parties is ideally assured 
through mutual contract. As in the “central authority” 
approach, the right to rectification is observable 
through rectification transactions, and the right to 
erasure is waived by way of contract. Again, any of the 
contracts becoming void can require the modification 
of the blockchain. 
Third, in the "pseudonymization" approach, data 
on the blockchain is pseudonymized so that it only 
qualifies as personal data to those participants who 
possess certain additional information that allows 
attribution of the data to a natural person. Only those 
participants who possess the additional information 
required for attribution are controllers. When these 
controllers jointly determine the purposes and means 
of processing the pseudonymized data and the data 
required for attribution, they are joint controllers. At 
this point, they need to establish, through a joint 
control arrangement, their respective responsibilities 
for compliance with the GDPR and for establishing 
lawful bases for data processing. Otherwise, they can 
create data processing agreements to establish clear 
responsibilities for compliance. They can uphold the 
right to rectification through rectification transactions 
and the right to erasure by eliminating the additional 
information – that is, by depriving themselves of the 
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ability to attribute data to specific individuals. As 
such, the “pseudonymization” approach is 
considerably less risky from a legal perspective but 
requires a solution architecture which ensures that the 
additional information required for attribution can be 
securely shared and reliably eliminated.  
 
3. Research approach 
 
We chose a participatory action research approach 
to guide the BAMF’s blockchain project. In particular, 
we held frequent functional and technical workshops 
to pinpoint problems, develop solutions, and foster 
reflective understanding. We also participated in 
developer, regular stand-up, and management 
meetings. 
 
3.1. Case description 
 
In Germany, asylum procedures require close 
collaboration and the exchange of information 
between various organizations at the municipal, state, 
and federal levels. Meanwhile, the exchange of certain 
data still takes place using paper records, which, in 
some cases, is still considered to be a more secure 
method of information sharing.  
Although various digitalization projects have been 
effective in reducing paper-based communication and 
have substantially increased the efficiency of 
procedures, some of these projects have also 
introduced new challenges. Most prominent among 
these challenges is the management of the Central 
Register of Foreign Nationals (AZR), Germany’s 
centralized database of information on foreign 
nationals in Germany. The AZR stores data on more 
than 26 million foreign nationals and grants more than 
14,000 authorities access to read and write in these 
records. 
The size of the AZR means that use often proves 
cumbersome, especially when it comes to logging, and 
informing users of data updates by other users. 
Moreover, the AZR is vulnerable to data quality issues 
because many updates are manual and many 
authorities do not use the AZR as their primary 
database. Although data security considerations are 
paramount, the AZR’s centralized design translates 
into elevated vulnerability against failure and attacks. 
Legally, the AZR is bound to the provisions of a 
detailed AZR law. While this law provides a solid 
legal foundation, it also reduces the AZR’s flexibility 
as many technical updates require a formal legislative 
process. 
These complexities have encouraged the BAMF to 
explore a decentralized alternative for cross-
organizational workflow management that would not 
require the extension of the AZR. After a preliminary 
evaluation, the BAMF narrowed down its 
technological options and decided to evaluate the 
prospects of blockchain technology in a Proof-of-
Concept (PoC).  
Over the course of the PoC project, the BAMF 
created a blockchain prototype for a simplified asylum 
procedure involving three authorities. The prototype 
used blockchain to log and propagate the completion 
of essential steps in the procedure. Moreover, an IT 
provider working for the BAMF coded the simplified 
asylum procedure into a smart contract to allow for 
automated monitoring of the workflow and automated 
triggering of subsequent process steps.  
Based on their evaluation of this prototype, the 
BAMF put forward a case for the broader adoption of 
blockchain in the asylum procedure. This case rests on 
the premise that Germany’s federal system severely 
limits centralized governance of asylum procedures. In 
particular, the German asylum procedure requires a 
solution that minimizes the redistribution of control 
and facilitates multilateral coordination.  
Effective multilateral coordination, on the other 
hand, requires new process logs to be swiftly 
disseminated to all organizations so that each may 
initiate coordinative actions as required. Blockchain 
technology provides precisely this functionality and 
allows participants in the blockchain network to work 
with a “shared truth”. Moreover, the procedure’s many 
cross-organizational handovers require a high degree 
of data integrity. While blockchain cannot ensure the 
accuracy of the propagated process logs, it can ensure 
their consistency and availability for later process 
forensics. 
Based on these arguments, the BAMF decided to 
advance its blockchain efforts and test the technology 
in a pilot project. Due to the complexity of the German 
asylum procedure, the BAMF limited the scope of its 
pilot project to two authorities (the BAMF and the 
Saxony’s central immigration authority (LDS), 
Germany) and the AnkER procedure in Dresden, 
Saxony. The AnkER procedure is a particular instance 
of the German asylum procedure that clusters three 
essential elements of the procedure at one facility in 
order to increase efficiency: arrival (German: 
Ankunft), decision (Entscheidung), and return 
(Rückkehr). Figure 1 presents a schematic snapshot of 
the AnkER procedure and illustrates the mutual 
dependence of the BAMF and the LDS in managing 
asylum applicants. 
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Figure 1. Schematic view of the use of blockchain in the 
pilot project 
Although the BAMF had already emphasized privacy-
by-design in the prototype, the use of actual personal 
data in the pilot required detailed consideration and 
observation of the GDPR’s requirements.  
The BAMF opted for a “pseudonymization” solution, 
as it deemed the collection of waivers from all affected 
third parties – that is, the asylum applicants – 
practically and legally impossible. It thus drafted an 
agreement with the LDS to set out the roles and 
responsibilities for joint control, as required by the 
GDPR. The BAMF also designed an architecture that 
enables both the separate sharing of process 
information required for effective cross-organizational 
workflow coordination and the sharing of information 
that allows the attribution of the process information 
to an asylum applicant. In particular, the pilot’s 
architecture involves the use of so-called privacy 
services for the safe storage and exchange of the 
information required for attribution – that is, the 
mapping of a pseudonymous blockchain identifier to 
the specific IDs in the authorities’ other databases.  
 
3.2. Action research 
 
The guidance we offered the BAMF followed an 
AR approach. AR was first introduced by Lewin in 
1946 [19] and describes a cyclical process to 
investigate the organizational implications of 
theoretically derived practices [4, 9, 22]. AR intends 
that researchers cooperate with practitioners to 
understand and solve organizational issues, report and 
abstract the knowledge gained, and derive relevant 
implications for theory and future research [31]. AR is 
used in many contexts as organizational issues are 
often complex and challenging to solve [2]. In contrast 
to observational case studies, practitioners remain 
continuously aware of the presence of the researcher, 
who actively engages in the role of a consultant or 
organizational member, for example, by developing 
models and methods or giving decisive advice based 
on knowledge and theories relevant to practice [2, 4, 
31]. Consequently, AR generates practical as well as 
theoretical outcomes. 
Rapoport [30] and Evered [11] describe AR as an 
iterative five-stage cycle. Each cycle starts with the 
identification or definition of the problem (stage one, 
diagnosing). In a second step, the researcher creates a 
plan involving specific actions which will mitigate or 
solve the identified problem (stage two, action 
planning). In creating the plan, the researcher employs 
a theoretical framework which should explain why and 
how the planned actions will bring forth the desired 
change. Subsequently, at least one of the actions 
planned in stage two is executed (stage three, action 
taking). Upon execution, the researcher analyzes the 
consequences of the action and considers whether the 
action has had the intended effect (stage four, 
evaluation). In the last step, the researcher identifies 
general findings from stage four and communicates 
these findings to allow the resolution of the problem at 
hand and similar problems in other contexts (stage 
five, specifying learning). After performing stages one 
to five, the next cycle starts with stage one again. 
Typically, researchers traverse the AR cycle at least 
twice so that learning from the first cycle can be 
implemented in the action planning, action taking, and 
evaluating phases of the second cycle. 
Following Yang et al. [34], we used a simplified 
AR approach with three cycles each involving three 
stages. In this simplified approach, stage one identifies 
and explains the problem (problem) whereas stage two 
(intervention strategies) combines the stages action 
planning and action taking, and stage three (reflection) 
combines the stages evaluation and specifying 
learning.  
In each cycle, we had a different focus. In cycle 
one, we conveyed the importance of privacy-
sensitivity in designing the prototype’s architecture. In 
cycle two, we encouraged a detailed legal analysis in 
order to evaluate the prototype’s compliance with the 
GDPR. In cycle 3, we aided the BAMF in creating a 
fully GDRP-compliant solution. 
Empirically, we based the problem analysis and 
reflection stages on a rich set of 19 semi-structured 
interviews with BAMF stakeholders and external 
blockchain experts, five workshops, several informal 
discussions, two expert reports, direct observations, as 
well as on secondary documentation. 
 
4. A GDPR-compliant blockchain 
solution for the German asylum 
procedure 
 
We conducted cycle one of our three action 
research cycles during the first half of the PoC, and 
BAMF LDS
Blockchain
Status x Status x Status x Status x Status x Status x
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cycle two spanned the latter half of the PoC. We began 
cycle three with the start of the pilot. 
 
4.1. Cycle 1: Design of a privacy-sensitive 
architecture 
 
Problem: The German asylum procedure requires 
many authorities and public organizations at the 
municipal, state, and federal levels to collaborate 
closely and exchange various information. Most of 
this information is sensitive, and most of the data 
processed in the course of the procedure are personal. 
Moreover, switching between different media and 
paper-based forms of communication is common. As 
a result, information on procedure updates propagates 
slowly, and the parties involved often lack a shared 
level of information, which increases the risk of 
substantial errors such as unlawful repatriation. In 
order to address these issues, the BAMF had already 
explored options for a cross-organizational workflow 
system. This exploration process had established that 
neither an extension of the AZR nor the introduction 
of conventional workflow management with 
centralized process governance would effectively 
address the identified issues. 
Intervention strategies: In a joint ideation 
workshop with the BAMF, we evaluated whether 
blockchain could be used to address the identified 
challenges and provide a workflow coordination 
solution for the German Asylum procedure. Based on 
the positive results of this evaluation, we encouraged 
the BAMF to advance its exploration to a PoC project. 
Because of the sensitive and personal nature of many 
of the data, we suggested that the BAMF should be 
especially sensitive to data privacy. 
During the PoC, the BAMF created a blockchain 
prototype for a simplified asylum procedure. The 
prototype used blockchain to log and propagate the 
completion of essential steps in the procedure. In order 
to foster privacy by design, we suggested that the 
prototype should minimize the amount of information 
stored on the blockchain, and preserve the data 
sovereignty of individual authorities. The BAMF 
heeded our advice and designed a three-layer 
architecture that stored a minimum amount of 
information on the blockchain (layer one – blockchain 
layer) and relied on blockchain adapters for efficient 
requests and off-chain sharing of data (layer two – 
adapter layer). Only in response to certain triggers 
would the blockchain adapters pull data from the 
authorities’ databases and workflow management 
systems (layer three – existing systems layer). 
In particular, the adapters respond to specific 
actions in the workflow management systems and 
communicate the data / status changes to the 
blockchain as events. Each event has a status, a time-
stamp, the ID of the authority that created the status 
update, and the AZR ID of the asylum seeker 
concerned. The adaptors submit these events to the 
blockchain. Once stored on the blockchain, the events 
can trigger the actions of a smart contract that allows 
the automated monitoring of the workflow and the 
automated triggering of subsequent process steps.  
As the PoC emphasized data privacy, the BAMF 
only worked with dummy data. Moreover, the BAMF 
decided to use a private permissioned blockchain that 
would allow fine-grained identity and access 
management. 
Reflection: The PoC demonstrated that a 
blockchain could provide the essential features of 
cross-organizational workflow coordination while 
adhering to important privacy-by-design principles. 
Moreover, a blockchain solution could maintain the 
asylum procedure’s decentralized workflow 
governance and ensure that each authority maintained 
guardianship over its data.  
 
4.2. Cycle 2: Detailed analysis of GDPR-
compliance 
 
Problem: During cycle 1, the BAMF focused 
primarily on the technical feasibility of a blockchain 
solution that was both effective and privacy-sensitive. 
However, the BAMF had designed its prototype 
without detailed consideration of data privacy 
regulations in general and the GDPR in particular.  
Intervention strategies: In cycle 2, we thus 
encouraged the BAMF to analyze its prototype 
solution from a legal perspective. The BAMF again 
heeded our advice and sought external legal advice on 
the prototype from a renowned professor in the area of 
blockchain and data protection.  
Reflection: From the legal analysis, it became 
evident that the prototype complied with data 
exchange regulation yet did not comply with the 
GDPR as the use of the AZR ID made all data on the 
blockchain personal data. However, the legal opinion 
indicated that a pseudonymization solution would 
resolve this problem. 
 
4.3. Cycle 3: Design of a GDPR-compliant 
architecture 
 
Problem: Because of the novelty of both the GDPR 
and blockchain, the BAMF could not resort to a best 
practice approach when designing a pseudonymization 
solution.  
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Intervention strategies: In order to mitigate the 
lack of best practices, we held several ideation and 
architectural refinement workshops. Moreover, the 
BAMF met with Germany’s Federal Commissioner 
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
(BfDI). In a two-day workshop, the BAMF and 
experts from the BfDI discussed the prototype and 
how it could be made to comply with the GDPR.  
These two measures lead to two essential 
modifications of the prototype’s architecture: 
One, the BAMF extended the adapter layer with a 
privacy service. This highly secure service maps 
pseudonymous Blockchain-IDs to the IDs used in the 
existing systems and repositories. Importantly, each 
authority has its own privacy service. Mapping 
information can be exchanged between privacy 
services to allow the receiving authority to attribute 
process updates.  
Two, the project team developed a rectification and 
erasure concept. When rectification of on-chain data is 
required, the competent authority can submit a 
rectification transaction to the blockchain. When 
erasure of the on-chain data is required, for instance, 
because of time limits placed on the storage of 
personal data, the authorities can delete the mapping 
in the privacy service, meaning they can no longer 
identify the respective pseudonymous blockchain ID. 
In other words, the on-chain data is not deleted, but it 
is depersonalized.  
Reflection: In the course of cycle three, the BAMF 
developed a fully functional pseudonymization 
solution.  
 
4.4. Blockchain system architecture 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a schematic view of the final 
GDPR-compliant architecture.  
The architecture has three layers. Layer one 
represents the databases and workflow management 
systems of the participants of the blockchain network. 
Layer two, the adapter layer, holds the blockchain 
adapters and privacy services. The blockchain 
adapters connect the databases and systems on layer 
one to the blockchain on layer three. They control the 
submission of status updates to the blockchain. The 
privacy services map the authorities’ specific 
identifiers to the pseudonymous identifiers used on the 
blockchain. Layer three holds the blockchain with the 
events. Similar to the prototype, each event has a 
status, a time-stamp, the ID of the authority that 
created the status update, and a pseudonymous ID that 
allows for the identification of asylum seekers only in 
conjunction with the privacy service. 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic view of the GDPR-compliant 
architecture of the BAMF’s blockchain solution 
Technically speaking, the BAMF uses a Hyperledger 
Fabric blockchain and standardized interfaces (e.g., 
REST or Web3J) to connect the layers. 
 
5. Design principles for GDPR-compliant 
blockchain design  
 
Legally, blockchain solutions can be reconciled 
with the GDPR through a “central authority”, a 
“shared responsibility”, or a “pseudonymization” 
approach. In practical terms, the pseudonymization 
option may often be preferable as it seeks to observe 
the right to erasure through technical means, rather 
than to use a set of voidable contracts. However, this 
option requires significant design considerations. In 
the guidance we offered the BAMF, we identified two 
tentative design principles that can aid these 
considerations: 
Design Principle 1: Do not store personal data on 
a blockchain  
Blockchain’s paradigm of tamper-resistant storage 
seems to jar profoundly with the right to rectification 
and erasure. As such, we encourage blockchain 
solution architects to keep personal data off-chain. 
Solutions exist in which tampering approaches would 
allow for the deletion of data stored on the blockchain 
layer [12]. Such an approach, however, would betray 
the idea of tamper-resistant storage. Consequently, 
this design principle may encourage the creation of a 
B2B blockchain network that does not process 
personal data – neither of the participants of the 
network nor of third parties. 
 
ID
Status x
ID
Status x
ID
Status x
ID
Status x
ID
Status x
Blockchain
Database
Privacy Service
Blockchain Adapter
BAMF
Database
Privacy Service
Blockchain Adapter
LDS
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Design Principle 2: If a use case requires that data 
on the blockchain be attributable to a natural person, 
use a highly secure off-chain mapping architecture. 
Certain use cases, such as the one we explored with 
the BAMF, require that information propagated and 
stored on the blockchain can be attributed to a natural 
person. As Design Principle 1 also applies in these use 
cases, the information on the blockchain must not 
allow attribution without further information, and 
blockchain solution architects should employ a 
pseudonymization solution [12]. The information 
required for attribution, such as a mapping of abstract 
blockchain IDs with specific IDs, has to remain off-
chain and should be propagated using secure 
information channels. With such a solution, data 
controllers can “rectify”, through the propagation of 
rectification transactions, and they can “erase”, 
through the deletion of the information required for 
attribution.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Centralized workflow management systems 
increase efficiency and reduce cost in contexts that 
permit centralized workflow governance. However, 
such systems are impractical in cross-organizational 
settings which prevent the delegation of workflow 
governance to a central authority. Blockchain-based 
solutions could be a promising alternative in these 
settings because they emphasize decentralized 
governance. However, the reconciliation of 
blockchain-based solutions with the GDPR is a 
significant challenge. 
In this paper, we discuss how the BAMF realized 
this reconciliation. Moreover, we detail the GDRP-
compliant solution that the BAMF developed for the 
German asylum procedure and present two actionable 
design principles for GDPR-compliant design of 
blockchain solutions in the area of cross-
organizational workflow management. 
From a practical angle, our study illustrates how 
blockchain solutions can meet the requirements of the 
GDPR. From a theoretical angle, we contribute to the 
growing field of IS research on the management of 
data privacy requirements [6, 35].  
Naturally, the BAMF’s architecture may not be the 
best solution in other contexts. Moreover, many 
elements of the architecture have yet to demonstrate 
their suitability for large-scale deployment beyond the 
two authorities involved in the BAMF’s pilot setting. 
We also caution against viewing the architecture as a 
stand-alone solution. It requires complementary 
organizational measures, such as the creation of an 
arrangement on the division of responsibilities among 
the joint controllers to establish full compliance with 
the GDPR. 
In sum, our study supports the argument that 
blockchain and the GDPR are not jarring opposites, 
and that we should continue the exploration and 
development of blockchain-based solutions for cross-
organizational workflow managment. The next 
essential step in this journey will be to establish 
standards and reference architectures that ensure the 
interoperability of various blockchain technologies 
and solutions.  
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